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ABSTRACT
Firm-specific variation in stock returns and fundamental performance measures is significantly
higher in industries that have a history of more investment in information technology (IT). We
hypothesise that IT is associated with creative destruction or product differentiation, either of which
can widen the performance difference between winner and loser firms. Thus,  economy-level
volatility can fall while firm-level volatility rises because firm-specific volatility cancels out in the
aggregate. Our results are consistent with rising firm-specific variation in US stocks reflecting a
rising pace of creative destruction; and with greater firm-specific variation in richer and faster
growing countries reflecting more intensive creative destruction in those economies, though other


























“A wave of innovation across a broad range of technologies, combined with considerable 
deregulation and a further lowering of barriers to trade, fostered a pronounced 
expansion of competition and creative destruction. The result through the 1990s of all 
this seeming-heightened instability for individual businesses, somewhat surprisingly, was 
an apparent reduction in the volatility of output and in the frequency and amplitude of 
business cycles for the macroeconomy.” 
Alan Greenspan, Speech on Economic Volatility, 2002. 
 
 
“The fundamental impulse that keeps the capital engine in motion comes from the new 
consumers’ goods, the new methods of production and transportation, the new 
markets...[The process] incessantly revolutionizes from within, incessantly destroying the 
old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the 
essential fact of capitalism.” 
Schumpeter, on the Creative Destruction, 1942. 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
During the past few decades, aggregate volatility in the U.S. economy fell significantly 
(Blanchard and Simon, 2001). In particular, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) find a 
structural break in U.S. GDP volatility around 1984. Volatilities of other macroeconomic 
variables, such as inflation and unemployment, exhibit similar patterns (Stock and 
Watson, 2002).
5 
In contrast, the volatilities of firm-level performance measures rose sharply over 
the same period. Figure 1 shows this intriguing divergence between macro (aggregate-
level) and micro (firm-level) volatilities. Figure 1 contrasts the aggregate volatilities of 
sales growth, return on assets (ROA), and the stock market return with the average 
volatilities of firm-level sales growth rates, ROAs, and stock returns.
6 All the firm-level 
volatilities trend upward from 1971 through 2000, while the aggregate volatilities trend 
down or hold steady. 
Lower aggregate volatility is clearly not due to lower firm-level volatility. The 
divergence between macro and micro volatilities implies that correlations among firms 
declined over time, both in real (sales growth rate and ROA) and financial (stock return) 
terms. In other words, firm-specific (idiosyncratic) volatilities rose faster than industry- 
or economy-wide (systematic) volatilities over the sample period.
7  
In this paper, we propose that creative destruction associated with the rapid 
diffusion of Information Technology (IT) plays a major role in the aforementioned 
divergence. Creative destruction, Schumpeter’s (1942) theory that economic growth 
arises from creative firms adopting new technology, thereby destroying stagnant firms, 
necessarily has winners and losers. We propose that the incorporation of IT by existing 
                                                 
5 Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2003) also show that GDP volatilities declined in 
other major advanced countries as well. In addition, Stock and Watson (2003) find that business cycles in 
G7 countries have not become more synchronized despite large increases in trade and openness. 
6 Details on construction of the three variables and calculation of volatilities are explained in Section 4. 
7 Morck et al.  (2000) and Campbell et al. (2001) report increased firm-specific volatility in U.S. stock 
return over the latter decades of the twentieth century.   3
industries induces a tremor of creative destruction, and that this explains both increased 
firm-level volatility and increased heterogeneity among firms. 
We propose that IT is a General Purpose Technology (GPT), like electrification in 
the early twentieth century. Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998) define a GPT as a 
technology that transforms the way firms conduct business in general. Bresnahan et al. 
(2002) show successful adopters of a GPT to possess complementary inputs, notably 
skilled labor and appropriate organizational forms. In a similar vein, Hayek (1941) 
stresses managerial foresight as a complementary input. However, the distribution of 
these complements is not uniform across firms. Thus, some firms succeed with IT; others 
fail. This increases firm-level volatility and heterogeneity as winners and losers diverge 
within industries.  
In the process of creative destruction, IT may further increase heterogeneity, even 
among successful adopters, by permitting more product differentiation in intangible 
aspects of output such as better customer services. Thus, even though firms in the same 
industry may produce similar tangible products, they could attract diverse pools of 
consumers, generating yet more heterogeneous performance among firms within the 
industry.
8 
Overall, IT plausibly makes firm performance more volatile and heterogeneous, 
raising firm-specific volatility.  
Panel A of Figure 2 shows IT investment (computers, software, and related assets) 
rising steadily from about 3% of total investment in the early 1970s to 17% by 2000. In 
2000, U.S. firms invested $273 billion in IT – almost 3% of GDP.
9, 
10 Panel B shows that, 
despite declining somewhat over time, substantial cross-industry variation in IT intensity 
(the ratio of IT capital to total capital) persists in 2000.
11 This variation provides a natural 
cross-sectional testing ground for studying the effects of IT assets on the volatilities of 
various performance measures. 
We find that industries with higher IT intensity exhibit larger firm-specific 
volatility in a range of performance measures. This finding is robust to controlling other 
industry characteristics that might affect volatility, such as research and development 
(R&D), average firm age, industry price competition, physical investment, foreign 
exposure, distribution of firm size, liquidity, book to market ratio and firm 
diversification.
12 We also find that the growth rate of idiosyncratic volatility is higher in 
more IT intensive industries.   
This finding provides several new insights into stock market volatility, the nature 
and consequences of IT investment, and economic growth. 
                                                 
8 Section 2 fully discusses the two channels how IT could affect firm-specific volatility.  
9 U.S. firms invested $180 billion in Research and Development (R&D), excluding federally funded R&D, 
or about the half of their IT investment. 
10  Time-series patterns of IT and volatility suggest a possible relationship between the two variables. 
However, since both exhibit strong time trends (IT intensity in many industries contains a unit root), they 
are subject to well-known inference problems. Thus, our paper mainly focuses on the cross-sectional 
effects of IT investment on volatility. 
11 Comparing diffusion patterns of IT and electrification across industries, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2003) 
show that IT has diffused more slowly than electrification. In the period of 1960-2001, cross-industry 
variation of IT has declined, but is still substantial – even in the latter part of the period. Details on the 
distribution of IT investment across industries are discussed in Section 3. 
12 Section 3 discusses in detail the different characteristics between IT and R&D.    4
First, our study identifies an underlying factor behind the recent increase in firm-
specific volatility in the U.S. stock market found in Morck et al. (2000) and Campbell et 
al. (2001). Schumpeter (1912) argues that innovation is a process of creative destruction, 
whereby creative new firms bring innovations to market, destroying established old firms. 
Higher firm-specific stock return volatility indicates a more extreme divergence of 
winners from losers, and so might be a sign of intensifying creative destruction in the U.S. 
economy. 
This builds on other recent findings regarding firm-specific returns volatility. For 
example, Wei and Zhang (2004) show that changes in stock return volatility closely track 
changes in earnings volatility. This suggests that real economic factors cannot be ignored 
in explaining the rising firm-specific returns variance in U.S. stocks.  We take this 
argument a step further by exploring and testing a detailed economic explanation of why 
real firm performance measures exhibit greater firm-specific volatility.  
Our explanation also accords with other recent findings relating firm-specific 
returns volatility to a variety of other important economic variables. Morck et al. (2000) 
and Durnev et al. (2004) find higher firm-specific volatility related to higher real GDP 
per capita and faster economic growth, respectively. This is consistent with more 
intensive creative destruction underlying faster and more sustained economic growth, as 
in Schumpeter (1912) and the new endogenous growth theory summarized in e.g. Aghion 
and Howitt (1998).  
Greater firm-specific volatility is related to general measures of financial 
development (Wurgler, 2000) and a variety of variables measuring more specific 
dimensions of financial development. These include reduced arbitrage costs (Bris et al., 
2004); greater transparency (Bushman et al., 2002; Durnev et al., 2004; and Jin and 
Myers, 2004); and more open capital markets (Li et al., 2004). King and Levine (1993) 
demonstrate a highly significant relationship between a county’s financial development 
and its economic growth, consistent with Schumpeter’s (1912) thesis that well-
functioning financial institutions and markets are necessary to finance the rapid growth of 
innovative firms. Higher firm-specific volatility might thus occur in countries with better 
financial institutions and markets because these permit faster creative destruction.  
This insight in no way precludes other theories of firm-specific returns variation. 
For example, Jin and Myers (2004) link greater firm-specific fundamentals and returns 
variation to better institutions to prevent corporate insiders and officials from 
confiscating firm-specific abnormal profits, and present convincing evidence of such a 
link. This view is also consistent with much other work, and ought to be regarded as a 
complement to ours, rather than an alternative theory. In fact, our paper might be 
considered a special case of their framework, in which greater transparency limits insider 
malfeasance, allowing better financing terms for honest innovators, and hence faster 
creative destruction.  
A second insight is that IT researchers might consider second moments. The 
existing IT literature focuses on first moments – the growth rates of individual firms, 
industries, and economies. Stiroh (2002) shows that innovation associated with IT can 
increase the growth rate of an industry.
13 Using a growth accounting framework, Oliner 
                                                 
13 The relationship between IT and economic performance is somewhat sensitive to the sample period. For 
example, Stiroh (2002) and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) find a significant positive IT effect using data 
after the late 1980s. However, Loveman (1994) and Stiroh (1998) fail to find any significant relationship in   5
and Sichel (2000) and Jorgenson (2001) show that the growth in IT capital stock accounts 
for over half the rise in U.S. productivity growth in the late 1990s. Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
(2003) find similar results at the firm-level. Since IT intensity is positively associated 
with firm-specific volatility, highly innovative industries could generally have both low 
aggregate volatility and high firm-specific volatility.
14 This is because the purely firm-
specific component of volatility is diversified away at the industry or economy level.  
A third insight undermines theories that explain macro volatility with micro 
volatility. Kahn et al. (2001) explain declines in aggregate volatility with IT investment, 
arguing that better inventory management, production planning, and demand forecasting 
reduce aggregate volatility. However, this implies declining firm-level volatility too, 
which Figure 1 belies. A variant of the Keynesian fallacy of composition applies. 
Aggregate variation is not the simple sum of firm variations. 
Fourth, our findings also illuminate the relationship between volatility and 
macroeconomic performance. Morck et al. (2000), Jin and Myers (2004), and others find 
higher firm-specific stock return volatility in richer countries. Durnev et al. (2004) find 
higher firm-specific stock return volatility correlated with faster GDP and productivity 
growth across countries. He et al. (2004) link faster GDP and productivity growth to 
increased turnover in the lists of countries’ leading firms. On surface, these results seem 
to contradict Ramey and Ramey (1995), who find countries with higher aggregate 
volatility to grow slower. Ramey and Ramey interpret their finding as consistent with the 
literatures on investment under uncertainty, such as Pindyck (1991), wherein increased 
uncertainty depresses corporate investment. However, our findings suggest low aggregate 
volatility can coincide with high firm-level volatility because creative destruction induces 
firm-specific volatility, which averages out in aggregate measures. In an economic 
growth model with creative destruction, Aghion and Howitt (1992) argue that both the 
average growth rate and the variance of the growth rate are increasing functions of the 
size of innovations as well as the size of the skilled labor force and the productivity of 
research. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines how IT can affect firm-
level volatilities. Section 3 describes the construction and characteristics of our industry-
level IT variable. Section 4 examines the characteristics of firm-level volatility, and the 
changes in correlation patterns of sales growth rates, ROAs, and stock returns. Section 5 
explains our decomposition of total volatility into firm-specific and systematic 
components. Section 6 discusses regression results, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.   Information Technology, Volatility, and Alternative Hypotheses 
Section 2.1 describes two channels through which IT might affect firm-specific volatility. 
Section 2.2 considers other relevant industry characteristics that might affect firm-
specific volatility. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the earlier period. Evidence of a time varying effect of IT is also consistent with the GPT theory, 
suggesting that the gains from new GTPs are delayed for some time. This delayed effect of IT is often 
called the IT productivity paradox. See Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998) for a theoretical explanation.    
14 In a similar spirit, Dunne et al. (2004) argue that the increasing dispersion of wages and productivity at 
the plant-level reflects the differential adoption of new technology, in particular, computer investment.   6
2.1   IT and Volatility 
Information Technology is often considered an example of general purpose technology 
(GPT), which Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2003), and 
others define as a technology that transforms the way firms conduct business.
15 Usually, 
the introduction of a new GPT is somewhat exogenous and episodic, but firms must 
adopt it to survive in the long run. As a GPT, IT spreads to firms in all sectors, permitting 
innovation in new processes and products (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). This 
section reviews two important channels through which IT causes firms to be more 
volatile and heterogeneous; that is, to exhibit greater firm-specific variation.  
 
First channel: IT increases firm-level heterogeneity by permitting improvements in new 
production processes with different values for different firms. 
 
Like most GPTs, IT investment benefits different firms differently. Successful 
adoption of IT requires complementary assets – Bresnahan et al. (2002) and Brynjolfsson 
et al. (2003) stress skilled workers and firm organization, while Hayek (1941) focuses on 
managerial foresight. Firms with more complementary assets gain the most from IT.
16 
These complementary assets mean that a firm’s effective IT capital stock could differ 
from its reported value. Since these complementary assets are predominantly firm-
specific, production processes should exhibit more heterogeneity as IT capital stock rises. 
In a similar spirit to this explanation, Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) also examine 
the ex-post effect of the introduction of IT. They emphasize the difference in the relative 
benefits of IT between incumbents (old firms) and entrants (new firms). Their intuition is 
that IT may not be fully functional in old firms because the resources used to run old 
technology are not fully transferable to new technology. Therefore, new firms without old 
technology benefit more from IT. In support of their theory, they find that industries with 
higher IT intensity experience larger decreases in aggregate market value when a new IT 
arrives.
17 If older firms are larger, this implies that heterogeneity between small and large 
firms should increase after a new IT arrives. Consistent with this line of argument, we 
find that correlations between large and small firm performance declines over time in the 
U.S.
18 In addition, we also find that correlations between large firms decrease as well. 
Thus, heterogeneous benefits of IT are evident not only between small and large firms, 
but between firms in general. 
 
Second channel: IT increases firm-level heterogeneity by increasing the importance of 
intangible aspects of output. 
 
  IT lets firms develop new products and improve intangible aspects of existing 
                                                 
15 Other examples of GPTs are steam engine, the factory system, and electricity. In particular, Jovanovic 
and Rousseau (2003) contrast characteristics of two GPTs: IT and electricity. 
16  For example, Brynjolfsson (2002) et al. find that firms with higher levels of both  computer and 
organizational investment have higher stock market valuations than firms that invest heavily in only one of 
the two. 
17 A similar argument is also found in Laitner and Stolyarov (2003), who suggest that new information 
technologies render old knowledge and physical capital obsolete and thereby reducing the market value of 
physical capital. 
18 Correlation patterns are discussed in Section 4.   7
ones, thus deepening the uniqueness of products made by successful IT adopters. If this 
deeper product differentiation reduces the substitutability of different firms’ products 
(Syverson, 2004), firm-specific volatility could rise as one firm’s product is revealed to 
be superior or attractive to certain groups of customers.  
  Surprisingly, given IT’s technological roots, its major benefits to firms seem to 
involve product differentiation of this sort.
19  Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) survey Fortune 
500 information system managers in 1997 and report the top five reasons for IT 
investment: 1) improving customer service, 2) targeting new customers, 3) improving 
quality, 4) reducing total cost, and 5) improving timeliness. Four reflect intangible 
aspects of output. Likewise, using data on the U.S. postal service, Mukhopadhyay et al. 
(1997) report that IT raises the quality of output measured by the timeliness of mail 
processing. Athey and Stern (2002) also find that IT decreases response times of 
emergency response systems and improves healthcare outcomes. 
A National Science Foundation (NSF) survey (2004) asks the managers of about 
two thousand firms if IT has small, moderate, or great effect on cost reduction and quality 
improvement. About 80% of respondents replied that IT has at least a moderate effect 
(about 40% for a great effect).
20 
 
2.2   Volatility and Alternative Hypotheses  
This section introduces other industry characteristics that might affect cross-industry 
variation in firm-specific volatility. Details about the construction of each corresponding 
control variable are in the appendix. 
  
Corporate Demography 
Smaller and younger firms might have greater dispersion in performance. An industry 
consisting of relatively young firms might thus exhibit greater firm-specific volatility.
21 
As a proxy for the average age of firms in an industry, we use two measures. Our first age 
measure is calculated using the listing year from CRSP monthly data. The second is the 
average age of the firms’ capital assets, measured as in Hall (1990). The two measures 
are highly correlated, and generate similar results in our multiple regressions. 
 
Price Competition 
The degree of price competition in an industry can affect firm-level performance 
variation. Intense price competition means that a negative firm-specific shock might 
cause bankruptcy, while a positive shock might provide an important competitive edge 
over rival firms.
22 Intense price competition might thus amplify firm-specific volatility.
23 
                                                 
19 This is a very unique nature of IT as a GPT. For example, electricity does not deepen the uniqueness of 
products. 
20 Managers of both small and large firms stress the importance of IT in their responses. There is little 
variation in answers to the two questions across firms with different sizes (e.g., less than $5 million, 5-10M, 
10-25M, 25-50M, and 50M or more) and across industries (e.g., manufacturing versus non-manufacturing). 
In this regard, IT differs from R&D, which is typically concentrated in relatively large firms in 
manufacturing. Other differences emerge in Section 3.2. 
21 For recent evidence, see Pastor and Veronesi (2003).  
22 Philippon (2003) develops a model in this spirit. 
23 International competition can also increase firm-level volatility (Comin and Mulani, 2003, Li et al., 
2004). Since international trade is concentrated in tradable goods industries (mainly manufacturing), this   8
Thus, we must ensure that any relationship between IT and firm-specific volatility is not 
merely an artefact of heterogeneity in price competition across industries.
24 To measure 
the intensity of price competition in each industry, we calculate Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). 
 
Distribution of Firm Size  
The distribution of firm size may reflect pre-existing heterogeneity among firms, which 
could affect volatility.
25 We calculate the standard deviation of the logarithm of firm 




Investment in conventional capital assets might also increase firm-level performance 
variation by increasing uncertainty about firms’ future cash-flows. Or, increased volatility 
might discourage firms from making capital expenditures.
26 Which of these two effects 
dominates in a cross-sectional analysis is an empirical question. Regardless, we include 
the investment rate in non-IT capital as an additional control variable.  
 
Other Intangible Investments 
Other intangible assets, such as R&D and advertising, might also affect firm-level 
performance variation. Both R&D and advertising are highly concentrated in a small 
number of industries. We discuss R&D in more detail in section 6 and in Appendix II.  
 
Foreign Exposure 
A firm’s reliance on foreign sales may affect its performance variation. However, 
whether foreign sales affect firm-specific or systematic (market- and industry-wide) 
volatility remains as an empirical question. For example, if firms in an industry mainly 
trade with a specific country, most of the volatility that comes from international business 
is mainly systematic (industry specific) volatility. On the contrary, if firms in the industry 
trade with many different countries whose economies exhibit low correlations with each 
other, it could affect firm-specific volatility in the industry. We calculate the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales to capture the effect of foreign exposure on volatility using the 
segment data of COMPUSTAT. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
predicts stronger increases in firm-level volatility in manufacturing, as opposed to sectors that mainly 
produce non-tradable goods. However we find strong increases in firm-level volatility in both. 
24 Alternatively, IT might amplify price competition. Using data on individual life insurance policies, 
Goolsbee and Brown (2002) find that the growth of the Internet reduced term life premium by 8 to 15%. 
This is consistent with the Internet reducing search costs and thus stimulating price competition. 
25 In fact, firm size distribution becomes more dispersed due to creative destruction through IT investment. 
By including this variable in our regression may unduly underestimate the significance of IT variables. As 
will be discussed in section 6, even after including this variable does not change the effect of IT at all.  
26  Another possible story that predicts a negative relationship between investment and volatility is a 
‘declining industry’ effect. If many firms are exiting a declining industry, high volatility might be 
associated with a low investment rate. In this sort of ‘plain destruction’, as opposed to ‘creative destruction’, 
systematic volatility should plausibly be elevated more than firm-specific volatility.    9
Firm Diversification
27 
A large literature links corporate diversification with both corporate governance problems 
and access to capital. In both cases, firm performance volatility could be affected.
28 Our 
firm diversification measure for each industry is the average number of two-digit 
segments reported in business segment data in COMPUSTAT. 
 
Other Control Variables 
Leverage is another candidate. A fall in the market value of a leveraged firm increases the 
volatility of its stock return and accounting earnings. Consequently, industries in which 
firms are more leveraged might exhibit greater cross-sectional performance variation.
29 
Liquidity might also affect performance variance. The easing of liquidity 
constraints should increase investment by previously constrained firms, but not other 
firms.  
 
3. Construction and Characteristics of the IT Variable 
This section outlines the construction of the IT variable. It then examines the variable’s 
characteristics.
30 The appendix provides technical details. 
  We calculate industry-level IT data from Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth 
(henceforth FRTW) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data 
list investment in 61 different types of assets at the two-digit (1987 SIC code) industry-
level.
31  We define the IT capital as the sum of seven types of computer hardware 
(mainframe computers, personal computers, direct access storage devices, computer 
printers, computer terminals, computer tape drives, and computer storage devices) and 
three types of software (pre-packaged software, custom software, and own-account 
software).
32  
  We use the Törnqvist index to aggregate these ten types of computer hardware 
and software into IT capital.
33 Using the same data, we define non-IT capital as all other 
asset types. Thus, the total capital is the sum of IT and non-IT capital.  
IT capital is distinguished from other capital by a rapid decline in its constant 
quality price index during the last few decades. The BEA uses the hedonic price method 
to estimate constant quality prices of computers.
34 The hedonic price falls as the quality 
                                                 
27 Unlike other control variables, the foreign exposure and firm diversification measures are calculated 
from COMPUSTAT segment data. Currently these data are available from 1985 on at WRDS. Reporting 
conventions for these data changed substantially in 1998. Thus the data range is different from that for 
other variables. Restricting our regressions accordingly does not qualitatively change our results as will be 
discussed in section 6. 
28 Refer Durnev et al. (2004) for further discussion. 
29 However, one should note that Black’s hypothesis on the effect of leverage is mainly about the time-
series causality between return and volatility and does not have much implication on the cross-sectional 
property. We investigate whether the cross-sectional variation of leverage has an effect on the cross-
sectional variation of volatility measures. 
30 In appendix II, we compare IT and R&D, another possible source of creative destruction, in detail.  
31 See Herman (2000) and for a detailed description of the data set. 
32 A recent comprehensive revision of the National Income and Product Accounts published by the BEA 
categorizes expenditure on software as fixed investment rather than costs of materials, as in COMPUSTAT. 
33 For further details, see Appendix I. 
34 See BEA (1998) for the hedonic price method used by the BEA. In general, quality improvement is faster 
in computers than in software.     10
of computers rises.
35 For example, the memory chip capacity increased at 35 to 45% per 
year, a stylized fact known as Moore’s law. Reflecting this rapid improvement in quality, 
the price of computers falls about 20% per year. This implies that real investment in 
computers can increase at 20% per year without changing nominal spending. This quality 
improvement is an important factor magnifying the rise in nominal IT investment. The 
real stock of IT capital also rose rapidly, but less so than real IT investment because of 
IT’s high depreciation rate – about 30% per year. In this context, Jorgenson (2001) argues 
that swiftly falling prices in IT provide powerful economic incentives for firms to 
substitute IT for other inputs, like conventional capital and labor. 
Three important episodes demarcate IT investment: the introduction of 
mainframes in the late 1970s, the introduction of personal computers from the early to 
mid-1980s, and Internet investment (a huge investment boom in hardware, software, and 
communication equipment) in the late 1990s. Throughout, software investment trended 
up as a share in total IT spending, exceeding hardware investment in the 1990s. 
Table 1 shows the cross-industry distribution of IT intensity in 1970, 1980, 1990, 
and 2000. IT intensity is the ratio of the IT capital stock to the total capital stock. 
On average, IT is more intensively used in the service sector than in 
manufacturing. However, there is a substantial variation of IT intensity within both 
sectors. Within manufacturing, IT intensity is high in industrial equipment (including 
computer-producing firms),  electronic equipment (including semiconductor firms), 
instruments (including laboratory and medical instruments), apparels, and printing and 
publishing. Within the non-manufacturing sector, wholesale  and business (including 
software firms), legal, and other service industries exhibit high IT intensity.
36 Agriculture, 
mining, transportation, and utilities all have low IT intensity. Figure 3 illustrates the 
distribution of IT intensity in 2000 across industries. Figure 3 shows that IT spending is 
almost normally distributed across all 50 industries.  In contrast, Figure 4 shows R&D, 
another possible source of creative destruction, to be highly concentrated in certain 
industries. We discuss more about the different characteristics of IT and R&D in section 
6 and in the appendix II.  
 
4. Correlation Patterns of Sales Growth Rate, ROA, and Stock Return 
4.1 Construction of the Data Series 
In this section, we investigate the volatility and correlation patterns of sales growth rate, 
ROA, and stock return to show increased heterogeneity among firms in the U.S. economy. 
We first estimate the volatilities of aggregate sales, aggregate ROA, and stock index 
return. We then calculate the averages of firm-level volatilities.  








= ∑       ( 1 )  
                                                 
35 Declines in the hedonic price of computers (or equivalently, improvement in the quality of computers) 
depend on productivity growth associated with technological innovations in IT producing industries such as 
semiconductors and computer manufacturing industries. For example, Chun and Nadiri (2002) decompose 
the sources of productivity in the U.S. computer industries into process and product innovations. In a 
similar vein, Irwin and Klenow (1994) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argue that learning-by-doing is 
a major determinant of productivity growth in the semiconductor industry. 
36 Financial industry is also one of heaviest users of IT within the non-manufacturing sector.   11
where Nt is the number of firms in quarter t and  , it Sales  is real sales of firm i, equal to 
nominal net sales (COMPUSTAT quarterly item 12) divided by the relevant price index 
of industry gross output.
37 Aggregate annual real sales growth is then 
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where  ,, ijt Sales  represent real sales of firm i in industry j at quarter t. In calculating firm-
level sales growth rate, we exclude firm-quarter observations with footnotes in 
COMPUSTAT. Footnotes flag unusual events, such as mergers, accounting changes, 
discontinued operations, and the like. Such events render sales growth estimates 
problematic. However, our results are qualitatively similar if we retain these observations. 
After calculating aggregate and firm quarterly sales growth rates, we measure their 
volatilities (standard deviations) using five-year rolling windows. 
Aggregate ROA and its volatility are defined similarly.
38  For each quarter t, 
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for  t N  the number of firms, and  , it TA  and  , it INCOME  the total assets (quarterly item 44)  
and operating income (quarterly item 21 minus quarterly item 5) , respectively, of firm i 
in quarter t. Aggregate ROA for quarter t is thus 
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37 See the appendix for the construction of the price index of industry gross output. 
38  Total assets are not available on a quarterly basis until 1976. Thus, we calculate micro and macro 
volatilities of ROA from 1981.   12
where  ,, ij t INCOME  and ,, ijt TA  represent the operating income
39 and total assets of firm i  
in industry j at quarter t. As with sales growth, we drop firm-quarter observations with 
footnotes. Again, our results do not change qualitatively if we retain these observations. 
  To calculate stock return volatilities, we use monthly stock return data from 
CRSP for 1971 through 2000. Again we use a five-year rolling window to calculate 
volatility for a given year. Aggregate volatility is the volatility of the value weighted 
portfolio consisting of all firms in both COMPUSTAT and CRSP. To gauge micro 
volatility, we average firm-level volatilities.  
 
4.2 Volatility and Correlation Patterns 
As discussed in Section 1, Figure 1 shows both the aggregate (dotted lines) and firm-level 
(solid lines) volatilities of real sales growth, ROA and stock returns. Firm-level 
volatilities are equally-weighted averages of individual firm volatilities. Value weighting 
generates similar patterns. Firm-level volatilities are clearly higher than aggregate 
volatilities, and the gap between them rose steadily over the decades. For example, the 
difference between firm and aggregate sales growth volatilities was 0.184 in 1971, but 
grew to 0.346 by 2000. The increased differences are much larger for ROA volatilities, 
rising from 0.015 in 1981 to 0.17 in 2000
40 and stock return volatilities, rising from 0.043 
in 1971 to 0.133 in 2000. When we partition firms into size quintiles, Figure 5 reveals 
similar patterns in each, with the largest change in the smallest firms. Rising firm-level 
volatility relative to aggregate volatility is evident across the entire corporate sector. This 
divergence implies declining correlations across firms over the same period.  
Figure 6 reports average correlations across pairs of firms for sales growth, ROA 
and stock returns – first for the full sample of firms and then for the largest quintile, 
smallest quintile, and then between largest and smallest quintiles separately. Correlations 
of stock returns are, on average, higher than correlations of sales growth and ROA. 
However, all three exhibit similar declines. Correlations within the largest quintile are 
usually higher than those in the other groups, but also exhibit strong downward trends. 
These figures clearly show that something changed in the U.S. economy to make 
individual firms more heterogeneous.  
  It is useful to formalize the firm-specific and systematic components of the 
volatility in firm-level outcomes to motivate our empirical tests in the following section. 
Suppose firm-level performance measure can be represented by a simple linear structure. 
 
,, it t it r η ε = +        ( 8 )  
 
where  , it r  represents the sales growth, ROA, or stock return of firm i in period t,  t η  
represents a component common to all firms, and  , it ε  represents a component specific to 
firm i. The correlation between firms i and  j  is  
                                                 
39 Operating income after depreciation is not readily available in the quarterly COMPUSTAT file, but is 
available in the annual data (annual item 178). However, it can be estimated as operating income before 
depreciation (quarterly item 21) minus the depreciation and amortization (quarterly item 5). 
40 If we use the median of firm volatilities for ROA, the difference between firm level and aggregate 
volatilities rises from 0.011 in 1981 to 0.021 in 2000, which is more comparable with the results of the 




cov( , ) 1
(, )
() ()1( / )
it jt
it jt












,t η σ is the common variance component and 
2
,t ε σ is the firm-specific component of 
variance, which we take to be homogeneous across firms. The magnitude of the 
correlation thus depends on the ratio 
22
,, (/) tt εη σσ. A lower correlation across firms could 
reflect either greater firm-specific variation or lower common variation, or both. 
 
5. Decomposition of Volatility Series 
This section describes how we decompose volatilities into firm-specific and systematic 
components. Our purpose is to isolate the idiosyncratic component that is not associated 
with general market- and industry-wide movements. In this regard, we follow Roll (1988) 
in distinguishing the ‘firm-specific’ variation from the sum of market- and industry-
related variations. For simplicity, we refer to the latter sum as the ‘systematic’ variation. 
To achieve necessary decomposition, we run the following regression 
specification used in Durnev et al. (2004): 
 
,, , 0 , , , , ,, ij t i imm t ij j t ij t rr r β ββ ε =+ + +     ( 1 0 )  
 
where  t j i r , ,  are real sales growth rate, ROA, or stock return for firm i in industry  j at 
time t  (t  represents quarter for real sales growth rate and ROA and month for stock 
return).  t m r ,  and  , jt r  are the market index and industry indices, and are value weighted 
averages excluding the firm in question. This exclusion prevents spurious correlation 
between firm and industry returns in industries that contain few firms. We run the 
regression for five-year rolling periods. Thus, we have the maximum of 20 observations 
for real sales growth rate and ROA and 60 observations for monthly stock returns.
41  
Firm-level regression results are aggregated to obtain the industry-level volatility 
measures. We calculate the absolute firm-specific variation and absolute systematic 
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where j i SSR , and j i SSM ,   are the unexplained (squared sum of residual errors) and 
                                                 
41 We repeat our exercise for various restrictions on number of observations in each regression. However 
the results of the paper are not very different from one another. Here, we report results based on restrictions 
on observations where 15(30) or more observations are available for sales growth rate and ROA (stock 
return). If we impose no restrictions, which basically means we include all young firms, there is slight 
improvement in the statistical significance of the results.     14
explained variations of firm i in industry j. The sums in (11) and (12) are scaled by 
number of firm-quarter (or firm-month) observations available in industry j. Thus, the 
industry-wide average 
2
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Panels A, B, and C of Figure 7 show the time-series patterns of the equal and 
value-weighted averages of each variation measure. To obtain value-weighted measures, 
we calculate equally weighted averages across all firms in an industry and then apply the 
industry weight. For real sales growth rate and stock returns, data start in 1971 (based on 
the years between 1967 and 1971) while ROA starts from 1981 (because the quarterly 
ROA data begin in 1976). 
Several patterns emerge from these figures.  
First, idiosyncratic variation increased dramatically in sales growth, stock returns, 
and, to a lesser degree, ROA. Equal and industry value weighted figures look very similar. 
Increasing idiosyncratic volatility is not confined to a few large industries.  
Second, Table 2 shows idiosyncratic volatility to be much larger than systematic 
volatility. For each year and each industry, we first calculate the ratio of idiosyncratic 
volatility to systematic volatility, and then calculate the means and medians of these 
ratios for the whole sample and two sub-periods – 1971-1983 and 1984-2000. The choice 
of 1984 as the break point is reflects the general agreement among economists that the 
U.S. economy exhibits a structural break at that time.
42 The ratio medians reported in the 
table indicate that the idiosyncratic volatility in the whole sample is three times as large 
as the systematic volatility in real sales growth and ROA, and about five times larger for 
stock return. The divergence between idiosyncratic and systematic volatilities becomes 
more pronounced in the second sub-period in general, especially for stock returns and 
ROA. Reflecting this rising idiosyncratic volatility, the industry average 
2 R also declines 
over the sample period (Figure 7). For real sales growth and stock returns, 
2 R declines by 
about 50% from the mid-1970s to the end of the sample period.  
Third, since the mid-1970s, the
2 R of stock returns provides a lower bound for the 
2 R  of the other two measures. This faster rise in idiosyncratic relative to systematic 
volatility for stock returns might reflect additional factors at work in that measure alone – 
such as reduced arbitrage costs and Internet investing. However, rising idiosyncratic 
volatility is clearly not just confined to stock returns. It is observed in real sales growth 
and ROA as well over the whole sample period.  
Fourth, in general, absolute idiosyncratic and absolute systematic variations are 
strongly positively correlated with each other for all three variables (Panel B of Table 2). 
A positive correlation is most apparent for ROA. In firm-level regressions, a positive 
correlation implies dependence between the independent variable and residual that 
produces inconsistent estimators. However, in this case, the correlation is between two 
aggregate measures calculated to represent industry-level average firm-specific and 
                                                 
42  See Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), and others for more detailed 
discussions.   15
systematic volatilities. This makes it possible to have a positive correlation between the 
two measures even if there is no correlation problem in the firm-level regression. In fact, 
this positive correlation is useful in inferring the sources of firm-specific variation, for it 
suggests that much firm-specific variation is heterogeneous reactions to market-wide 
shocks. That is, firms often react differently when hit by the same economy-wide shock, 
thus inducing firm-specific variation.  
  Fifth, ROA volatility follows a pattern somewhat different from that of the other 
two series. The correlation between absolute idiosyncratic and absolute systematic 
volatility is largest for ROA, and consequently the decrease in its 
2 R is smallest. Part of 
the high correlations might be due to outliers: there are several sharp spikes in the 
comovement of absolute idiosyncratic and absolute systematic volatility. Dropping both 
extreme 1% tails of firm-year observations causes the absolute idiosyncratic and absolute 
systematic ROA volatilities to resemble those of stock returns and sales growth rates. 
Extreme values in ROA are much more frequent than in stock returns and sales growth 
rates.
43 Another possibility is that earnings might be ‘managed’, while sales and stock 
return are not. For example, if firms manage their earnings more when the economy 
exhibits more volatility, we would see a larger positive correlation between absolute 
idiosyncratic and absolute systematic measures for ROA. To address this issue, we use 
cash flow to asset ratios after controlling for accruals using the method of Chan et al. 
(2001). This generates qualitatively similar results. Further investigation is needed to 
clarify these issues.  
 
6. Regression Analyses 
In this section, we test whether industries with higher IT intensity exhibit larger 
idiosyncratic variation. First, we examine the bivariate relationships between our 
volatility measures and IT intensity (the ratio of IT capital to total capital). We use this 
rather than current IT investment because our focus is the extent to which the utilization 
of information technology affects cross-sectional patterns of volatility.  Creative 
destruction plausibly depends not just on current IT investment, but on IT intensity – 
firms’ overall abilities to apply IT to their ongoing businesses.  Second, we investigate 
the effect of IT intensity on volatility measures in a multiple regression framework 
controlling for the other industry characteristics described in Section 2.2.  
 
6.1 Bivariate Regressions 
We run weighted least square regressions (WLS) for each year and report Fama-MacBeth 
coefficients and t-statistics.
44 In calculating Fama-MacBeth t-statistics, we adjust for 
possible serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in coefficient estimates using the 
method of Newey and West (1987) as modified in Pontiff (1996).
45 All variables are 
transformed by taking natural logarithms. We exclude financial industries (1987 SIC 
                                                 
43 One cause of these outliers is very small total asset figures. 
44 All regressions are weighted by the industry share of market capitalization, sales, and total assets for 
stock return, sales, and ROA, respectively. However, the results are not sensitive to using different weights.  
45  As Jin and Myers (2004) note, this may be an overcorrection since spurious serial correlation is pssible 
in small sample coefficient estimates even if the estimation errors for the coefficients are uncorrelated. 
However, we follow Pontiff (1996) and Jin and Myers (2004) in taking a conservative approach in 
calculating t-statistics.   16
codes from 6000 to 6999) because of accounting data (such as sales and ROA) 
incompatible with that in other industries. Thus, the maximum number of industries is 50, 
consisting of 20 manufacturing and 30 non-manufacturing industries.
46 We also discard 
industries containing fewer than 5 firms, and industries whose IT stock is not defined. 
The tables also report the average number of industries used in the regressions. 
Table 3 presents regressions using IT intensity to explain three types of volatility 
(absolute idiosyncratic, absolute systematic and idiosyncratic relative to systematic) for 
each volatility measure (sales growth, ROA, and stock returns). Since the 
2 R  measure is 
confined within the unit interval and highly skewed, we apply a logistic transformation as 
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We report regression results for the whole sample (from 1971 to 2000 for stock 
return and sales growth rate and from 1984 to 2000 for ROA) and for two sub-periods.
47 
The central finding is that absolute idiosyncratic variation is strongly positively 
correlated with IT intensity. Figure 8 (Panels A, B, and C) graphs the relationship 
between IT intensity and idiosyncratic volatility in 2000. IT intensity is also positively 
correlated with absolute systematic variation. However, discussed below, the positive 
correlation between absolute systematic measure and IT intensity appears due to a strong 
positive correlation between IT intensity and other control variables (especially, R&D) 
that explain much of systematic volatility. 
The logistically-transformed R
2 measure in (14), denoted ψ, captures the relative 
importance of absolute idiosyncratic versus absolute systematic volatility. IT intensity is 
positively related to ψ for the full sample period for stock returns. This relationship is 
significant at 1%, and its analogue for sales growth is significant at 10%.  Sales growth is 
more strongly correlated with ψ in the second subperiod, with a significance exceeding 
1%. 
However, the results for ROA are weak. Even though IT intensity explains 
absolute idiosyncratic volatility, it fails to explain ψ – and even has wrong sign (negative). 
However, as discussed below, the significant negative coefficient disappears if we 
include other control variables in multiple regressions. This suggests that the negative 
coefficient on IT is picking up other industry characteristics. 
The bivariate regressions involving returns volatility in Table 3 have substantial 
adjusted R
2s – over 40% for the whole sample for the absolute idiosyncratic regressions. 
The R
2s are nearly as high form the sales growth and ROA volatility regressions.     
We can think of two reasons for a weaker relationship with sales growth and ROA 
than with stock returns. First, the volatilities of sales growth and ROA must be estimated 
                                                 
46 The number of industries used in this paper is almost the same as in Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) and 
Stiroh (2002). 
47 The results for ROA are reported for the second subperiod only. Quarterly ROA data are available from 
1976 on, so we could theoretically obtain decomposed volatility series from 1980 on. However, we require 
more than five firms in an industry to calculate ROA volatility series, and this condition is met in only 
thirty industries through the early 1980s.   Thus we perform regression from the mid 1980s for ROA. 
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using quarterly observations. Stock returns, however, can be estimated using monthly 
data, and so are more precise. Second, we might have an omitted variable bias. If missing 
control variables capture systematic volatility and are correlated with IT intensity, our 
estimated coefficients of IT intensity are biased. To address this issue, we move on the 
multiple regressions analyses. 
 
6.2 Multiple Regressions 
In this section, we include all the industry-level control variables described in Section 2.2 
in our regressions. These controls are: average firm age, non-IT capital investment rate 
(I/K), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, leverage, liquidity, firm size distribution, foreign 
exposure, firm diversification, and measures of intangibles such as R&D, advertising, and 
book-to-market ratio.
48 
Table 4 reports the averages of annual cross-sectional correlation coefficients and 
their associated significance levels. Note that IT intensity is strongly positively correlated 
with R&D and advertising spending. This suggests possible complementarities between 
intangibles. IT intensity also positively correlates with non-IT capital investment and 
liquidity, implying that more rapidly growing and less cash constrained industries invest 
more in IT. The book-to-market ratio, which in many studies use to proxy for intangible 
assets, is negatively correlated with IT.  Intriguingly, IT is the only variable correlated 
with all the other intangible measures. For example, R&D is correlated with IT and book-
to-market, but not with advertising spending.  Firm diversification is negatively 
correlated with both IT and non-IT capital investment, though the latter is insignificant. 
This could reflect more diversified firms delaying investment.   
We isolate the independent contribution of IT to volatility by including all of 
these variables in the regressions in Table 5.  Because business segment data are 
unavailable for earlier years, the foreign exposure and firm diversification measures are 
not included. Table 6 reports analogous regressions including these two additional 
controls. 
The key results from Tables 4, 5 and 6 are as follows.  
First, IT is significantly positively correlated with idiosyncratic variation – both 
absolute and relative to systematic variation. In fact, IT is the only variable that explains 
both with consistent positive signs and significance levels. These findings survive the 
inclusion of all of the control variables discussed above. This is consistent with the use of 
information technology being related to creative destruction, which increases 
heterogeneity among firms.   
Second, IT intensity is not significantly related to systematic volatility.  Including 
controls, especially R&D intensity, renders IT insignificant in regressions explaining 
systematic volatility.
49  The component of IT related to systematic variation is thus 
correlated with R&D intensity, and this explains the significant relationship between IT 
and systematic volatility in bivariate regressions. Also, IT attracts a positive and 
significant coefficient in regressions explaining idiosyncratic relative to systematic 
                                                 
48 See Appendix I for the construction of each variable. 
49 As noted above, R&D is quite concentrated in the manufacturing sector, which is perhaps subject to more 
business cycle risk than other sectors. To control for this, we include a manufacturing sector dummy along 
with IT intensity and R&D. R&D remains significant, suggesting its coefficient is not a mere artefact of 
business cycle exposure.   18
volatilities in both sales growth and stock return; but R&D does not. Overall, IT seems 
related to idiosyncratic volatility, while R&D appears related to systematic volatility. 
Appendix II explores this further by discussing different characteristics of IT and R&D 
that might explain this. 
Third, the signs and significance of IT intensity are very stable. This is in stark 
contrast to the coefficients of the various controls, which are quite sensitive to the 
particular specification in many cases.  We return to this below.   
Fourth, by adding control variables, negative relationship between IT intensity 
and logistically-transformed 
2 R measures in bivariate regression disappears. However, 
still we could not get positive and significant relationship between the two measures 
either. 
Since many of the control variables have multiple interpretations, we refrain from 
interpreting their coefficients and significance levels.  Also, many of the control variables 
are quite sensitive to the particular regression specification. For example, when only IT 
intensity, age, I/K (non-IT investment over non-IT capital stock) and book-to-market 
ratios are included, book-to-market is negatively related to absolute idiosyncratic or 
systematic volatility. However, when we include more variables, the sign becomes 
positive for the absolute volatility measures. This instability makes interpreting the 
variable problematic. However, there are a few variables that tell consistent stories. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) attracts positive and significant coefficients in 
regressions explaining relative idiosyncratic volatility in both stock returns and sales 
growth rates. However, HHI is negatively related with both absolute volatility measures. 
Combining these results implies that a higher HHI depresses systematic volatility more 
than idiosyncratic volatility. Advertising is also negatively related with both absolute 
volatility measures, but positively related to idiosyncratic relative to systematic volatility. 
These findings are consistent with monopoly power and brand names helping firms 
smooth their performance and rendering creative destruction less necessary. Firm age is 
typically negatively related to both absolute volatility measures, but its explanatory 
power for idiosyncratic relative to systematic volatility is slight. Older industries are 
perhaps more stable, and might also be less affected by creative destruction.  Industries in 
which all firms are nearly the same size exhibit lower volatility – both idiosyncratic and 
systematic. Note also that including firm diversification and foreign exposure in the 
Table 6 regressions barely changes the explanatory power of IT intensity for all the 
volatility measures.    
 
6.3 Robustness Checks 
We repeat our empirical exercise in several different ways. First, we check whether the 
de minimus restriction on the number of observations used in calculating our volatility 
measures affects the results. Second, we check whether outliers drive the results by 
cutting off the extreme 1% from both tails of the total distribution of each volatility 
measure. Third, we check whether the inclusion or exclusion of footnote stamped data 
from COMPUSTAT alters the results. Fourth, we try nominal rather than real IT intensity 
in our regressions. None of these alternative approaches qualitatively changes our results.  
 
6.4 Endogeneity 
We have shown that industries with greater IT intensity exhibit greater idiosyncratic   19
volatility. However, we have not resolved whether IT intensity causes idiosyncratic 
variation.  The converse might be true, or a third factor might cause both. 
  The converse, that high idiosyncratic volatility causes IT intensity might follow if 
more volatile industries invest more in IT capital to decrease the volatility through, for 
example, better inventory management. This implies declining firm level volatility over 
time as IT intensity rises, which is testable.   
A third factor merits consideration if buttressed by a plausible economic 
explanation.  One possibility is that high idiosyncratic volatility reflects pre-existing 
heterogeneity among firms that is unrelated to creative destruction, and that this 
heterogeneity correlates with the marginal productivity of IT.   Again, this is testable. 
To test whether IT intensity reflects pre-existing heterogeneity, lowers volatility, 
or raises it, we regress 
 
,1 , , () jt jt jt j Vol IT Vol α βγ ε + ∆= + ++      ( 1 5 )  
 
where  ,1 jt Vol + ∆ is a five-year log difference of one of our volatility measure
50 (absolute 
idiosyncratic, absolute systematic, or idiosyncratic relative to systematic) for industry  j , 
, jt IT   is IT intensity for industry j, and  , jt Vol   is volatility of industry j at time t. We 
include  , jt Vol  to control initial differences in the level of volatility. If IT intensity raises 
idiosyncratic volatility, β should be positive in the absolute and relative idiosyncratic 
volatility specifications of (15). If high volatility induces IT investment aimed at reducing 
volatility, we expect a negative β. If IT investment is correlated with pre-existing high 
volatility, β should be insignificant.    
  The regression specification in equation (15) resembles those used in the 
economic growth literature, for example in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). In this 
literature, special attention attaches to  , jt Vol  because, in cross-sectional regressions, the 
residuals, j ε , may contain a common factor that affect all the industries. If this factor is 
correlated with  , jt Vol , its regression coefficient is biased. In our case, this problem does 
not arise in specifications using absolute idiosyncratic volatility because, by construction, 
that measure is independent of common shocks. There can thus be no relationship 
between the residuals and  , jt Vol . However, specifications using absolute systematic 
volatility or idiosyncratic relative to systematic volatility could be vulnerable to this 
problem. Consequently, caution is warranted in interpreting results for these two 
volatility measures. 
Table 7 reports Fama-MacBeth regression coefficients for (15), along with t-
statistics robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  The results can be 
summarized as follows: 
Absolute idiosyncratic volatility rises after high IT intensity. The sole exception is 
absolute idiosyncratic stock return variation using the whole sample, where the 
coefficient is still positive, but the t-statistic is only 1.67. The coefficient is significant in 
                                                 
50 Varying the time horizon by measuring the growth rate in volatility over the subsequent one, two, three, 
… ten years generates results qualitatively similar to those in Table 7    20
each sub-sample. Idiosyncratic relative to systematic variation also rises subsequent to 
high IT intensity. These results are most significant for the second subperiod, and relative 
idiosyncratic volatility in ROA is insignificant, mirroring our earlier cross sectional 
results. Note also that γ  is negative. Thus the intensity of creative destruction (measured 
by idiosyncratic volatility) tends to decrease, all else equal, in the absence of sustained IT 
investment.  
Table 7 is consistent with IT intensity causing higher volatility, and difficult to 
reconcile with IT intensity being either aimed at reducing volatility or an artefact of pre-
existing heterogeneity.  
 
7. Conclusion 
We find that higher firm-specific volatility in firm stock returns, sales growth, and ROA 
is associated with higher investment in IT. These findings are robust to a wide range of 
specification changes and to including as control variables: average firm age, 
concentration, other capital investment, leverage, foreign exposure, and spending on 
intangible asset like R&D. We also show that subsequent volatility growth is higher in 
industries with greater IT intensity. 
  Thus, investment in IT is associated with greater heterogeneity in firm 
performance within an industry. We propose that this reflects a divergence between 
winners and losers in devising profitable IT applications, and that the growing IT 
investment of the past decades hastened creative destruction, as described in Schumpeter 
(1912), as successful adopters flourished and other firms stagnated. Closely related to this, 
heterogeneity among successful adopters might also increase if IT investment permitted 
greater product differentiation, especially along intangible dimensions of output. Again, 
this lets winners diverge more sharply from losers.  
   This explains how volatility in economy aggregate stock market return, sales 
growth, and ROA fell while firm-level variation in stock returns, sales growth, and ROA 
all rose. The firm-specific components of the latter rose faster than their systematic 
components, thus decreasing their correlation across firms. This fallacy of composition in 
volatilities effect is greater in industries that invested more heavily in IT.  
  Our findings also explain why greater firm-specific volatility should be related to 
better developed financial systems and better economy performance. Better developed 
financial systems let a broader range of firms raise money and undertake IT investments 
at lower cost. More IT investment reflects, to some extent at least, more intensive 
creative destruction, and hence faster growth and higher standards of living.   
Morck et al. (2000), Bris et al. (2004), Bushman et al. (2002), Durnev et al. (2004), 
and Jin and Myers (2004) present evidence consistent with interpreting firm-specific 
variation as a measure of stock market transparency. Our findings in no way undermine 
this view. Rather, more transparent stock markets might well permit more intensive 
investment in new technologies such as IT by making the capital needed to finance it 
cheaper.  Nonetheless, stock market volatility clearly tracks the volatilities of   
fundamentals, limiting, but not necessarily eliminating, the viability of explanations of 
individual stock price comovement based on purely stock market-based explanations like 
investor herding. 
  R&D intensity behaves quite differently from IT intensity. Systematic (market-
wide plus industry-related) variation measures based on stock returns and fundamentals   21
are unrelated to IT intensity after controlling the effect of R&D intensity. The component 
of IT intensity related to systematic variation appears to be highly correlated with R&D 
intensity. R&D itself is primarily correlated with market-wide and industry-related 
comovement. This perhaps reflects underlying economic differences between R&D and 
IT related innovation. Further work is needed to clarify this.  
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Appendix I: Data Construction 
 
Price Index for Sales 
To calculate real sales, we divide nominal sales by the price index of two-digit level 
industry gross output obtained from Gross Product Originating (GPO), published by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
51 GPO price index data are available only from 
1977 on. To estimate pre-1977 price indexes, we use prices of gross output from Office 
of Employment Projection data produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
 
Construction and Aggregation of Capital Stock (IT and Non-IT)  
We construct the capital stock of asset i in industry j at time t using the perpetual 
inventory method with asset-specific geometric depreciation rates (δi). Thus a particular 
capital stock can be defined as  
 
t j i t j i i t j i I K K , , 1 , , , , ) 1 ( + − = − δ      (A.1) 
 
where the depreciation rate of computers and software is about 0.31 (See Fraumeni 
(1997) for asset-specific depreciation rates.). 
To aggregate N types of capitals, we use the Törnqvist index, which is the 
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Finally, the ratio of aggregate real capital stock is  
                                                 
51 See Lum et al. (2000) for a detailed description of the GPO data set.   26
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R&D and Advertising 
We obtain R&D expenditure (annual item 46) from COMPUSTAT, and deflate this using 
the price index of gross domestic product (GDP). Following the method of Chan et al. 
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where RDS is R&D capital stock, RD is R&D expenditures, and δ is a 20% straight-line 
depreciation rate.
52 We define R&D intensity as the ratio of real R&D capital stock to 
real PPE (annual item 8). PPE is deflated by the price index at the two-digit industry-
level from the BEA FRTW. Using advertising expense (annual item 45), we also define 
advertising intensity as the ratio of advertising expense to PPE.  
 
Firm Age  
We construct age variable using two different method. First, we track the listing year 
from CRSP monthly data and measure calendar age of each firm. Second, following Hall 
(1990), we construct the average age of capital and use it as a proxy for the age of firm. 
We first calculate the age of capital of each firm as the ratio of accumulated depreciation 
to current depreciation and amortization (annual item 14) for the current year. 
Accumulated depreciation is defined as gross PPE (annual item 7) minus net PPE (annual 
item 8). Then we calculate the equally weighted average of individual firm ages within 
each industry to obtain industry-level estimates.  
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
We construct sales-based the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). HHI is defined as the 
sum of squared firm’s share of sales within an industry 
 
Conventional Investment 
We also construct the capital investment rate (I/K) as the ratio of non-IT investment at 
time t to non-IT capital stock at t-1 (in real terms) using the FRTW data set. We use a 




We calculate industry-level book-to-market ratio as the ratio of industry aggregate value 
of common equity (annual item 60) to market capitalization of common stock (annual 
item 25 multiplied by annual item 199). 
                                                 
52 Most studies use 10-25% depreciation rate for R&D capital. For example, using the patent data, Pakes 
and Schankerman (1984) estimated the depreciation rate of R&D capital that varies from 18-36%, on 
average, 25%.   27
 
Foreign Exposure 
To measure the extent of foreign exposure, we use COMPUSTAT geographic segment 
data. For each industry, we calculate the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. Currently, 
geographic segment information is available in COMPUSTAT from 1985 on from 
WRDS. However, a significant change in the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s 
(FASB) segment reporting standards occurred in 1998, when SFAS No. 131 superseded 
the previous segment-reporting rules under SFAS No. 14. The new standard is effective 
beginning with December 1998 fiscal year-ends. Given this change, we calculate foreign 
exposure up to and including 1997. 
 
Leverage and Liquidity 
We estimate leverage as the ratio of the sum of short-term debt (annual item 34) and 
long-term debt (annual item 9) to total assets (annual item 6); while liquidity is defined as 
the ratio of current assets (annual item 4) to current liabilities (annual item 5). 
 
Distribution of Firm Size and Firm Diversification 
Refer section 2 for the construction of these two variables.   
 
Appendix II:  IT vs. R&D 
We hypothesize that IT affects volatility patterns in the U.S. economy via creative 
destruction. IT may not be the only investment that leads to creative destruction. Another 
highly plausible candidate is R&D. For example, Kothari et al. (2002) find that R&D 
investment has a stronger effect on future earnings variability than investment in property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE). Chan et al. (2001) find similar results using stock returns. 
Barron et al. (2002) find that the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is negatively associated 
with intangible assets, such as R&D and advertising. This appendix compares IT with 
R&D. In Section 6, we compare the relative importance of IT and R&D in explaining 
firm-specific (and systematic) volatility. 
First, in contrast to IT investment, the distribution of R&D spending is highly 
concentrated in a few industries (See Figures 3 and 4.). Figure 4 shows the cross-industry 
distribution of R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D capital to PPE using nominal dollars) in 
2000. R&D intensity is exceptionally high in five durable goods manufacturing industries, 
chemical products (including pharmaceuticals), business services (including software), 
and other services (including R&D and testing services). In 2000, R&D spending by the 
industrial machinery,  transportation equipment, and chemical products industries 
accounted for almost 80% of total R&D spending in the manufacturing sector (NSF, 
2003).
53  
In contrast, more than 75% of industries have R&D intensities below one percent. 
And in a sizeable fraction of industries, most firms report no R&D activity whatsoever. 
                                                 
53 According to a National Science Foundation survey (1999), nineteen out of the twenty firms with R&D 
spending greater than one billion dollars reside in four manufacturing industries. For example, IBM and 
Hewlett-Packard reside in industrial machinery; General Electric, Lucent, and Intel in electric and 
electronic equipment; General Motors and Ford in transportation equipment, and Johnson & Johnson and 
Pfizer in chemical products. Currently, COMPUSTAT classifies IBM as a business service firm because its 
sales of software and computer related services are greater than its sales of computer hardware.    28
Kothari et al. (2002) report a median R&D intensity of zero for 40% of two-digit 
industries.  
In addition to being highly localized in certain large firms in a few industries, 
R&D seems aimed at developing specific sorts of tangible products. An NSF (1999) 
survey reports more than 70% of R&D spending used to develop new products such as 
machinery or medicines. Investment in these sorts of innovation is highly dependent on 
possessing large research infrastructures – well-equipped laboratories and highly 
educated researchers.  
Schumpeter (1942) argues that innovations of this sort are best undertaken by 
large, quasi-monopolistic firms, or in partnership with them. These firms have sufficient 
internal cash flow to finance such infrastructure and sufficient stability to attract and keep 
risk-averse technical experts. In contrast, IT seems more like the turn-of-the-century 
electricity, steel, and machinery that inspired Schumpeter’s (1912) description of creative 
destruction consisting of rapidly growing upstarts displacing established giants.  
Thus R&D and IT investments may, at the present time in the U.S. economy, 
typically represent two qualitatively different forms of innovation. IT is a general purpose 
technology, whose application creates value proportional to certain complementary inputs, 
such as managerial talent and allows qualitative product differentiation in a broad cross-
section of industries. Indeed, Figure 3 shows that IT spending is almost normally 
distributed over 50 industries. In contrast, Figure 4 shows that R&D is highly specific to 
certain firms in certain industries. Big R&D spenders are large, established firms with 
capital intensive on-going innovation programs of the sort described in Schumpeter 
(1942).  
A second difference between IT and R&D is that the latter often provides a return 
only in the very long run – see, for example, Chan et al. (2001). New drugs, new 
automobile designs, and the like often require a decade or more of investment before 
generating positive cash flows. In contrast, IT investments seem to produce returns over 
much shorter horizons.  
The prolonged uncertainty regarding the outcome of R&D investment might 
increase the systematic volatility of R&D intensive stocks and decrease their firm-
specific volatility during certain periods. If all the major pharmaceuticals firms are racing 
to develop a new drug, their stocks tend to move together, reflecting changes in expected 
demand for the drug, as long as they look equally likely to win. This leads to industry-
wide comovement. Once it becomes clear which firms are winning, their prices begin to 
diverge from those of the losers. This results in firm-specific volatility.
54  If long periods 
of uncertainty are punctuated by sudden revelations of who is winning, we might observe 
a high degree of comovement most of the time in R&D intensive industries.     
Berk et al. (2004), citing the same prolonged R&D investment period, propose 
another mechanism through which R&D activity might correlate with systematic 
volatility. They point out that, unlike major capital investments, which are undertaken in 
a given year and then become sunk costs, investment in a given R&D project must 
continue over many years. For example, an oil company firm developing a new oilfield 
extraction technology must continue funding such an initiative for many years to expect a 
return, and generally reviews this funding commitment each year. Even if the future 
technological risk associated with the project is highly firm-specific, and thus 
                                                 
54 This line of reasoning follows from Shiller (1989).   29
diversifiable, the decision each year about continuing the R&D project or not depends on 
systematic factors, such as the interest rate and the expected oil price after the completion 
of the project. 
Some logic of this sort appears to apply to R&D, but not to IT. Section 6 shows 
that R&D intensity is related to systematic variation, and IT is entirely unrelated to 
systematic volatility after controlling for R&D intensity. Why this is so probably has to 
do with the differences listed above; however more work is clearly needed to clarify this. 
   30
Figure 1. Aggregate (Macro) and Firm-Level (Micro) Volatilities, 1971-2000 
This figure plots aggregate and firm-level volatilities of real sales growth rate, return on asset (ROA), and 
stock return. Aggregate volatilities of real sales growth rate and ROA are calculated from the growth rate of 
aggregate real sales and aggregate ROA for all the firms in COMPUSTAT using 5 year rolling windows. 
Aggregate stock return volatility is calculated using the value-weighted portfolio consisting of all firms 
both in CRSP and COMPUSTAT using 5 year rolling windows. Firm-level volatilities are averages of 
volatilities of real sales growth rate, ROA, and stock return of all firms in the sample. 
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Figure 2. Time-Series and Cross-Sectional Patterns of IT Investment, 1971-2000 
Figure 2(a) plots the share of IT investment in equipment and total investment in the U.S. (all in nominal 
dollars). IT investment is defined as the sum of computers and software investment. Total investment is the 
sum of equipment & software and structures. Figure 2(b) illustrates the cross-industry distribution of 
logarithm of IT intensity where IT intensity is measured as the ratio of IT capital to total capital in 1994 
real dollars. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of IT Intensity in U.S. Industries, 2000 
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Figure 4. Distribution of R&D Intensity in U.S. Industries, 2000 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. Firm-Level Volatility by Size Quintiles 
This figure plots equally weighted average of firm-level volatility for each size quintile. 
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Figure 6. Patterns of Correlations 
This figure plots correlation patterns of real sales growth rate, return on asset (ROA), and stock return. 
Large-Large (Small-Small) indicates the average correlation patterns among the firms in the 1
st quintile (5
th 
quintile). Large-Small denotes the average correlation patterns between firms in the 1
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Figure 7. Decomposed Volatilities: Idiosyncratic, Systematic, and R
2 
This figure plots the equal and value weighted (industry weight) averages of decomposed volatilities for 
each industry. For the value-weighted averages, we first calculate the equally weighted averages of 
decomposed volatilities of firms in each industry and then apply the industry weight to obtain the value-
weighted averages.  
 
Panel A: Equally/value weighted average for sales growth rate 
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Panel B: Equally/value weighted average for ROA 
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Panel C: Equally/value weighted average for stock return 






































Figure 8. IT Intensity and Idiosyncratic Volatilities in 2000 
The figures show the relationship between IT intensity and idiosyncratic volatility measures in 2000. 
Bivariate regression results in 2000 are also reported. Details on regression specification and sample 
restrictions are reported in Table 3. t-statistics are calculated from heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors. 
 
Panel A: IT intensity and idiosyncratic volatility of stock return in 2000 
ln(idiosyncratic volatility of stock return) = -2.472 +0.273ln(IT)   adjusted R
2 = 0.390 
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Panel B: IT intensity and idiosyncratic volatility of real sales growth in 2000 
ln(idiosyncratic volatility of sales growth) = -1.719 +0.340ln(IT)   adjusted R
2 = 0.230 
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Panel C: IT intensity and idiosyncratic volatility of ROA in 2000 
ln(idiosyncratic volatility of ROA) = -2.668 +1.168ln(IT)   adjusted R
2 = 0.559 
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Table 1. IT Intensity by Industry and by Year: 50 Industries and 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 
IT intensity is the ratio of IT capital to total capital in percentage. IT capital is defined as the sum of computers and software. 
 
IT intensity in nominal dollars  IT intensity in 1994 real dollars  Sector 
 
Industry 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Agriculture (1-2)  1 Farms  n.a.  n.a. 0.061  0.347 n.a. n.a.  0.042  0.666 
  2 Agricultural services  n.a. 0.293  0.137  0.124 n.a. 0.059  0.092  0.237 
Mining (3-6)  3 Metal mining  n.a.  n.a. 0.250  0.642 n.a. n.a.  0.175  1.242 
  4 Coal mining  n.a.  n.a.  0.202 0.879  n.a.  n.a. 0.146  1.684 
  5 Oil extraction  0.174  0.509 0.370 0.776 0.010 0.174 0.286 1.733 
  6 Nonmetallic minerals  n.a.  0.041 0.409 1.504  n.a. 0.011  0.288  2.907 
Construction 7  Construction  0.607 0.271 0.840 4.031 0.036 0.073 0.591 7.381 
Manufacturing (8-27)  8 Lumber & wood  1.090 1.615 1.296 2.205 0.066 0.434 0.927 4.081 
   Durables (8-17)  9 Furniture  1.120 1.836 2.954 4.443 0.075 0.535 2.182 7.915 
       10 Stone & clay  0.584  3.502 1.995 2.829 0.040 0.967 1.418 5.318 
  11 Primary metal  0.740  0.663  0.863 1.352 0.048 0.183 0.611 2.583 
 12  Fabricated  metal  1.327  1.024 2.501 4.348 0.089 0.295 1.820 7.798 
  13 Industrial machinery  7.713  7.817 7.694  12.831  0.929 2.847 6.065  19.917 
  14 Electronic equipment  0.807  3.984 5.946 8.268 0.074 1.363 4.520  14.206 
  15 Transportation equipment  1.111  1.577 4.374 3.627 0.078 0.473 3.176 6.634 
 16  Instruments  2.558  2.486  8.106 11.459 0.217  0.849 6.394  17.646 
  17 Miscellaneous manufacturing  2.879 1.369 3.526 4.697 0.216 0.416 2.613 8.161 
  Non-durables (18-27)  18 Food  0.925 0.752 1.765 2.250 0.061 0.209 1.265 4.252 
 19  Tobacco  2.229  1.352  3.020 2.339 0.162 0.404 2.263 4.203 
 20  Textile  1.211  0.517  1.506 3.262 0.076 0.144 1.104 5.790 
 21  Apparel  3.540  2.281  3.806 5.101 0.296 0.741 2.883 8.596 
 22  Paper  0.549  0.779  1.091  1.453 0.032 0.202 0.773 2.774 
  23 Printing & publishing  2.176  2.629 8.334  14.635  0.175 0.876 6.581  22.020 
 24  Chemicals  0.683  0.564  2.218 3.259 0.049 0.164 1.608 5.989 
  25 Petroleum products  0.732  0.797 0.760 0.451 0.044 0.212 0.542 0.891 
  26 Rubber & plastics  1.622  1.210 1.980 3.153 0.098 0.320 1.402 5.961 
 27  Leather  3.647  2.035  2.103 3.928 0.238 0.502 1.466 6.765   44
Table 1. IT Intensity by Industry and by Year: 50 Industries and 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 
[Continued] 
 
IT intensity in nominal dollars  IT intensity in 1994 real dollars  Sector 
 
Industry 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 1970  1980  1990  2000 
Transportation (28-34)  28 Railroad transportation  0.047 0.028 0.045 0.430 0.003 0.007 0.031 0.800 
  29 Local transit  0.442  0.246  0.395 1.037 0.037  0.072 0.281 1.987 
  30 Trucking and warehousing  0.384  0.118 0.451 2.009 0.023 0.028 0.309 3.587 
  31 Water transportation  0.644  0.126 0.151 0.823 0.040 0.034 0.109 1.541 
  32 Transportation by air  0.670  0.766 0.376 0.537 0.039 0.185 0.258 1.021 
  33  Pipelines  0.352 0.109 0.231 1.101 0.036  0.032 0.167 1.943 
  34 Transportation services  1.007  0.395 1.601 8.708 0.073  0.127 1.229  13.761 
Communication (35-36)  35 Telephone  0.210 0.266 1.584 2.536 0.020 0.087 1.188 4.156 
  36 Radio & television  0.630  0.706 0.630 2.436 0.043 0.215 0.468 4.136 
Utilities (37)  37 Electricity & gas  0.071 0.213 0.772 0.870 0.005 0.063 0.555 1.665 
Trade (38-39)  38 Wholesale  3.939  5.840  11.169 18.879  0.480  2.267 9.089  27.264 
  39  Retail  0.614 1.138 3.801 4.569 0.051 0.365 2.805 8.362 
Services (40-50)  40 Hotels  0.197 0.463 0.455 1.078 0.013 0.130 0.332 2.178 
  41 Personal services  0.413  1.216 2.201 4.321 0.035 0.372 1.622 7.606 
  42 Business services  2.579  8.280  29.380 28.941  0.409  4.346 24.254  41.404 
  43 Auto service  0.454  2.166  1.306 1.652 0.031  0.576 0.894 3.073 
  44 Miscellaneous repair  0.861  1.889 3.802 6.845 0.065  0.595 2.813  10.821 
  45 Motion pictures  0.765  2.867 3.518 5.581 0.078  0.900 2.634 9.689 
  46  Amusement  0.252 0.931 1.259 2.221 0.020  0.293 0.933 4.307 
  47  Health  0.959 1.113 4.267 5.477 0.081  0.360 3.194 9.607 
 48  Legal  9.613  4.318  14.430  21.950 1.227  1.707 11.880 30.150 
 49  Education  16.624  4.607  3.386 3.853 1.830  1.444 2.571 6.999 
  50 Other services  9.521  4.307  12.003 17.229  1.227  1.811 9.693  25.615 
  Average (equally weighted)  1.984  1.745 3.725 5.523 0.199 0.606 2.571 7.981 
   45
Table 2: Time-Series Patterns of Decomposed Volatility Series 
In panel A, we first calculate the ratio of absolute idiosyncratic volatility over absolute systematic volatility for each 
year for each industry. Then we calculate averages and medians for the whole sample and for each sub-period. In 
panel B, we calculate the correlations between absolute idiosyncratic volatility and absolute systematic volatility for 
each industry and then calculate averages and medians for the whole sample and for each sub-period.  
 
Panel A: The ratio of absolute idiosyncratic volatility to absolute systematic volatility 
 
Stocks Sales ROA
Whole mean 5.965 4.857 7.1
median 4.585 3.159 3.273
N 1431 1388 920
First Period mean 3.277 3.06 3.952
(1971-1983) median 2.927 2.227 2.471
(1981-1983 for ROA) N 609 566 128
Second Period mean 7.957 6.095 7.61
(1984-2000) median 6.584 3.895 3.38
N 822 822 792  
 
 
Panel B: Correlations between absolute idiosyncratic and absolute systematic volatility 
 
Stocks Sales ROA
Whole mean -0.013 0.558 0.712
median -0.022 0.612 0.836
N 4 94 94 9
First Period mean 0.311 0.417 0.295
(1971-1983) median 0.349 0.454 0.689
(1981-1983 for ROA) N 48 45 42
Second Period mean 0.164 0.48 0.703
(1984-2000) median 0.203 0.536 0.814
N 4 94 94 9    46
Table 3. Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regression Results on Effects of IT on Volatilities 
(Bivariate Regression Analysis) 
The model is estimated with WLS over a cross-section of industries for each year. All regressions are weighted by 
the industry share of market capitalization, sales, and total assets for stock return, sales, and ROA, respectively. 
Dependent variables are logarithms of absolute idiosyncratic, absolute systematic and relative idiosyncratic 
volatilities for stock return, real sales growth, and ROA. Relative idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the difference 
between logarithms of absolute idiosyncratic and absolute systematic volatilities. The sample period is 1971-2000 
for stock return and sales and 1984-2000 for ROA. IT is the ratio of IT capital to total capital stock (all in 1994 real 
dollars). IT capital is defined as the sum of computers and software. In constructing volatility measures, firms with 
less than 30 monthly observations for stock return and firms with less than 15 quarterly observations for real sales 
growth and ROA, are excluded. The sample also excludes industries with less than five firms and industries whose 
IT capital is not defined. Average coefficients are calculated using Fama-MacBeth method. t-statistics are adjusted 
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West method. Coefficient estimates of intercepts are not 
reported in the table. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface. 
 
 










  Stock abs.  idio.  0.409 40.733 0.259
a  12.891 
  Stock abs.  syst.  0.215  40.733 0.156
a  7.200 
1971-2000  Stock rel.  idio.  0.246 40.733  0.102
a  7.249 
  Sales abs.  idio.  0.213 36.500 0.274
a  12.107 
  Sales abs.  syst.  0.133  36.500 0.233
a  6.560 
  Sales rel.  idio.  0.030 36.500  0.040
c  1.792 
  Stock abs.  idio.  0.477 39.769 0.268
a  16.707 
  Stock abs.  syst.  0.238  39.769 0.142
a  12.668 
1971-1983  Stock rel.  idio.  0.340 39.769  0.126
a  16.614 
  Sales abs.  idio.  0.226 32.538 0.280
a  24.633 
  Sales abs.  syst.  0.183  32.538 0.295
a  13.297 
  Sales rel.  idio.  -0.009  32.538  -0.015 -0.766 
  Stock abs.  idio.  0.357 41.471 0.251
a  8.156 
  Stock abs.  syst.  0.197  41.471 0.167
a  4.801 
1984-2000  Stock rel.  idio.  0.175 41.471  0.084
a  4.060 
  Sales abs.  idio.  0.204 39.529 0.269
a  6.957 
  Sales abs.  syst.  0.094  39.529 0.186
a  4.052 
  Sales rel.  idio.  0.060 39.529  0.083
a  7.856 
  ROA abs.  idio.  0.319 36.647 0.751
a  7.652 
  ROA abs.  syst.  0.336 36.647 0.852
a  13.490 
  ROA rel.  idio.  0.038  36.647  -0.101
b  -2.369 
a: Significant at 1 percent level.   
b: Significant at 5 percent level.  
c: Significant at 10 percent level. 
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Table 4. Average Cross-Sectional Correlation Coefficients between Control Variables 
Average cross-sectional correlation coefficients between variables are calculated for 1971-2000. IT is the ratio of IT capital to total capital stock (all in 1994 real 
dollars). Age is the average age of firms in an industry. (I/K) is the ratio of non-IT investment in year t to non-IT capital in year t-1. Book-to-market is the ratio 
of common equity to market capitalization of common stock. Advertising expenditure (ADV) and R&D capital stock (R&D) is scaled by property, plant, and 
equipment (PPE) (all in real dollars). Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) variables are calculated using sales. Dispersion is the standard deviation of log of firm 
size (market capitalization) for each industry. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets. Liquidity is defined as the ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities. Foreign exposure is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. Firm diversification is the average number of two-digit segments. 
Correlation coefficients related to foreign exposure and diversification are reported for 1989-1997. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. Coefficients significant 
at 10% or better are in boldface. 
 
   ln(IT)  ln(AGE)  I/K 
Book-to-





ln(AGE)  -0.170                     
   (0.247)                     
I/K  0.331  -0.273                   
   (0.014)  (0.048)                   
Book-to-Market  -0.290  0.250  -0.346                 
   (0.039)  (0.073)  (0.009)                 
ln(1+R&D)  0.504  -0.143  0.140  -0.276               
  (0.000)  (0.318)  (0.326)  (0.044)               
ln(1+ADV)  0.347  0.016  -0.009  -0.173  0.154             
  (0.011)  (0.913)  (0.951)  (0.224)  (0.277)             
HHI  -0.189  -0.403  -0.002  0.016  -0.102  -0.038           
  (0.190)  (0.002)  (0.989)  (0.912)  (0.477)  (0.794)           
Dispersion  -0.146  0.266  -0.047  -0.220  -0.026  -0.067  -0.058         
  (0.323)  (0.055)  (0.747)  (0.118)  (0.857)  (0.646)  (0.688)         
Leverage  -0.202  -0.205  0.127  0.027  -0.319  -0.224  0.099  -0.145       
   (0.160)  (0.147)  (0.373)  (0.850)  (0.017)  (0.107)  (0.491)  (0.312)       
Liquidity  0.285  -0.009  -0.177  -0.018  0.155  0.403  0.135  -0.200  -0.478     
  (0.042)  (0.949)  (0.209)  (0.901)  (0.275)  (0.002)  (0.344)  (0.156)  (0.000)     
Foreign Exposure  0.109  0.055  -0.069  -0.164  0.383  0.087  0.196  0.338  -0.296  0.127   
  (0.461)  (0.709)  (0.637)  (0.254)  (0.004)  (0.550)  (0.170)  (0.013)  (0.032)  (0.380)   
Diversification  -0.280  0.531  -0.144  0.103  -0.201  -0.119  0.169  0.419  -0.252  -0.068  0.325 
  (0.041)  (0.000)  (0.307)  (0.470)  (0.149)  (0.404)  (0.228)  (0.001)  (0.066)  (0.636)  (0.017)   48
Table 5. Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regression Results on Effects of IT on Volatilities (Multivariate Regression Analysis) 
The model is estimated with WLS over a cross-section of industries for each year. All regressions are weighted by the industry share of market capitalization, 
sales, and total assets for stock return, sales, and ROA, respectively. Dependent variables are logarithms of absolute idiosyncratic, absolute systematic and 
relative idiosyncratic volatilities for stock return, real sales growth, and ROA. Relative idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the difference between logarithms of 
absolute idiosyncratic and absolute systematic volatilities. In constructing volatility measures, firms with less than 30 monthly observations for stock return and 
firms with less than 15 quarterly observations for real sales growth and ROA, are excluded. The sample also excludes industries with less than five firms and 
industries whose IT capital is not defined. IT is the ratio of IT capital to total capital stock (all in 1994 real dollars). Age is the average age of firms in an industry. 
(I/K) is the ratio of non-IT investment in year t to non-IT capital in year t-1. Book-to-market is the ratio of common equity to market capitalization of common 
stock. Advertising expenditure (ADV) and R&D capital stock (R&D) is scaled by property, plant, and equipment (PPE) (all in real dollars). Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) variables are calculated using sales. Dispersion (DIS) is the standard deviation of log of firm size (market capitalization, sales, and total 
assets). Leverage (LEV) is the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets. Liquidity (LIQ) is defined as the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities. Average coefficients are calculated using Fama-MacBeth method. t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-
West method. Coefficient estimates of intercepts are not reported in the table. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface.   
 
 
Period   Volatility Measure  Adj. R
2 
No. of 




ADV) HHI  DIS  LEV  LIQ 
  Stock abs.  idio. 0.804  40.733  0.061
a -0.811














  Stock rel.  idio. 0.588  40.733  0.091
a  -0.057  -1.321
b -0.310
c  -0.141  1.107
b 1.011
a  -0.009 0.538 0.006 





a  0.639 -0.428 0.353
a  -1.689 0.162 
  Sales abs.  syst. 0.578  36.500 0.032  -0.212  3.233 1.041
a 1.045
b -3.132




  Sales rel.  idio. 0.364  36.500  0.074
a  -0.055 -0.445 0.307 0.003 3.771
a  0.124 0.063 -0.048  -0.367
a 
  Stock abs.  idio. 0.797  39.769  0.063
a -0.714
a  1.069  0.424
a -0.333
c  -0.464  -0.129
a  0.100  -2.687
a 0.188
a 
  Stock abs.  syst. 0.670  39.769  -0.015  -0.681
a  1.936  0.484
a -0.012 -0.972  -0.852
a  0.006  -2.774
a  -0.076 
  Stock rel.  idio. 0.688  39.769  0.078
a  -0.034 -0.867 -0.059 -0.321 0.508 0.724
a  0.095 0.087 0.264
a 
1971-1983  Sales abs.  idio. 0.494  32.538  0.104
b  -0.283  5.802
a 1.355
a 1.213
b  -0.208  -3.859
a 0.204
b -3.780
a  -0.139 









  Sales rel.  idio. 0.339  32.538  0.044
b -0.365
b -3.004
a  0.026 -0.330  5.577
b 0.723
a  0.023 -0.608  -0.530
b 
  Stock abs.  idio. 0.809  41.471  0.059
b -0.885
a  -0.511 0.104 0.319
b  -0.016  0.705
b 0.294
b  -0.493  0.210
c 
  Stock abs.  syst. 0.743  41.471  -0.041
a -0.811








  Stock rel.  idio. 0.512  41.471  0.101
a  -0.074  -1.668
c -0.501
b  -0.004  1.565
a 1.230
a  -0.087  0.883
c  -0.191 
  Sales abs.  idio. 0.591  39.529  0.106
a -0.254





a  -0.090  0.393
a 
1984-2000  Sales abs.  syst. 0.562  39.529  0.010  -0.438





a  -0.471  0.635
a 
  Sales rel.  idio. 0.383  39.529  0.096
a 0.183
b  1.512 0.523 0.258 2.390
a  -0.334  0.093
 c  0.381  -0.242
a 
  ROA abs.  idio. 0.532  36.647  0.127
b  -0.214 -1.415  -1.869
b 3.344
a -3.306




  ROA abs.  syst. 0.587  36.647  0.128  -0.711





c  1.593  1.903
a 
  ROA rel.  idio. 0.528 36.647  -0.001  0.497
b  -2.472 0.180 1.141
b  0.983 1.496 0.109 1.430
b -0.649
b 
a: Significant at 1 percent level.  
b: Significant at 5 percent level.  
c: Significant at 10 percent level.   49
Table 6. Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regression Results on Effects of IT on Volatilities: Foreign Exposure and 
Diversification 
The model is estimated with WLS over a cross-section of industries for each year. All regressions are weighted by the industry share of market capitalization, 
sales, and total assets for stock return, sales, and ROA, respectively. Dependent variables are logarithms of absolute idiosyncratic, absolute systematic and 
relative idiosyncratic volatilities for stock return, real sales growth, and ROA. Relative idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the difference between logarithms of 
absolute idiosyncratic and absolute systematic volatilities. In constructing volatility measures, firms with less than 30 monthly observations for stock return and 
firms with less than 15 quarterly observations for real sales growth and ROA, are excluded. The sample also excludes industries with less than five firms and 
industries whose IT capital is not defined. Foreign Exposure (FE) is defined as the ratio of foreign sales to the sum of domestic and foreign sales. Firm 
diversification (SEG) is the average number of two-digit segments. Since geographic and business segment information in COMPUSTAT is available from 1985 
and has a significant change in the FASB segment reporting standards in 1998 and we construct 5-year average of the variables, the sample period is restricted to 
1989-1997. Average coefficients are calculated using Fama-MacBeth method. t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the 
Newey-West method. Coefficient estimates of intercepts are not reported in the table. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface.   
 
Volatility 
Measure  Adj. R
2 
No. of 




ADV)  HHI DIS LEV LIQ 
 
FE  SEG 





a  -0.109  1.088
a 0.195
b  -0.021 0.085  0.906
a  -0.176 
Stock abs.  syst.  0.765  39.889 -0.036





a  -0.423  0.443
a 0.646
a  -0.040 









a  0.260 -0.137 










a  0.137 




a  -0.094 0.766  0.398




Sales rel.  idio.  0.422 39.667 0.098
a 0.241 0.554 0.154  -0.231
a 1.040
b -0.875




ROA abs.  idio.  0.583 36.556 0.144
b 0.534 -0.151 -0.383  0.954  -7.645
a -2.445
a 1.344




ROA abs.  syst.  0.642 36.556  0.127 -0.363 -0.517 -0.416  0.294  -6.305
b -3.047
a 1.165




ROA rel.  idio.  0.538  36.556  0.017 0.897 0.366 0.034  0.660
a -1.340
b  0.602  0.179
c  -0.252 -0.644 -0.100 -0.361 
a: Significant at 1 percent level.   
b: Significant at 5 percent level.   
c: Significant at 10 percent level. 
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Table 7. Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regression Results on Volatility Growth and IT 
In this table, we test whether industries with high IT intensity exhibit faster volatility growth. Dependent variables 
are 5 year log difference in each volatility measure between year t and t+5. Independent variables are ln(IT) and 
ln(VOL). ln(IT) is log of IT intensity in year t for each industry and ln(VOL) is log of volatility measure in year t. 
The model is estimated with WLS over a cross-section of industries for each year. All regressions are weighted by 
the industry share of market capitalization, sales, and total assets for stock return, sales, and ROA, respectively. In 
constructing volatility measures, firms with less than 30 monthly observations for stock return and firms with less 
than 15 quarterly observations for real sales growth and ROA, are excluded. The sample also excludes industries 
with less than five firms and industries whose IT capital is not defined. Average coefficients are calculated using 
Fama-MacBeth method. t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West 
method. Coefficient estimates of intercepts are not reported in the table. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are 
in boldface.   
 
 














  Stock  abs.  idio. 0.215 41.240 0.039  1.666 -0.224
a  -3.783 
  Stock abs.  syst.  0.173  41.240  0.041
a  4.883  -0.256
a  -4.961 
1976-2000  Stock rel.  idio.  0.376  41.240 0.060
a  5.077  -0.738
a  -10.286 
  Sales abs.  idio.  0.227  37.680  0.110
a  5.120  -0.388
a  -7.495 
  Sales abs.  syst.  0.289  37.680  0.106
a  4.107  -0.490
a  -9.788 
  Sales rel.  idio.  0.449  37.680 0.042
b  2.441  -0.892
a  -15.791 
  Stock  abs.  idio. 0.218 40.750 0.006  0.154 -0.149
c  -1.906 
  Stock abs.  syst.  0.112  40.750  0.028
a  4.225  -0.300
a  -18.609 
1976-1983  Stock rel.  idio.  0.405  40.750 0.092
a  20.965  -0.829
a  -9.297 
  Sales abs.  idio.  0.295  33.875  0.082
a  23.033  -0.406
a  -13.224 
  Sales abs.  syst.  0.247  33.875  0.078
a  3.925  -0.398
a  -6.099 
  Sales rel.  idio.  0.390  33.875 -0.012 -1.485 -0.820
a  -21.387 
  Stock abs.  idio.  0.214  41.471  0.055
b  2.498  -0.259
b  -3.395 
  Stock abs.  syst.  0.202  41.471  0.048
a  5.243  -0.235
b  -3.224 
1984-2000  Stock rel.  idio.  0.362  41.471 0.045
a  3.445  -0.695
a  -8.634 
  Sales abs.  idio.  0.195  39.471  0.123
a  4.157  -0.379
a  -5.091 
  Sales abs.  syst.  0.309  39.471  0.119
a  3.512  -0.534
a  -10.336 
  Sales rel.  idio.  0.477  39.471 0.068
a  7.555  -0.925
a  -12.174 
(ROA)  ROA abs.  idio.  0.221  37.333 0.424
a  15.333  -0.452
a  -8.108 
1986-2000  ROA abs.  syst.  0.209  37.333  0.371
a  6.410  -0.374
a  -8.250 
  ROA rel.  idio.  0.384 37.333 -0.028 -0.491 -0.700
a  -11.312 
a: Significant at 1 percent level 
b: Significant at 5 percent level.   
c: Significant at 10 percent level. 
 